Introduction
A simple, informal statement of the paradox of the greatest ordinal-the paradox commonly attributed to Cesare Burali-Forti-might be this:
Given any well-ordered collection of objects, we may ask which position an object in the collection occupies. Indeed, since the collection is well-ordered, an object will come first (the least object in the ordering), another will come second (the least object in the ordering besides the first), yet another will come third (the least object in the ordering besides the first and the second), and so on. Other objects might come after those occupying the finite positions. So there might be the least object besides those occupying the finite positions, another object after that, and so on again. Ordinal numbers are objects representing positions in wellordered collections of objects. Evidently, there is natural ordering of the ordinal numbers: the object representing a certain position comes before the object representing later positions (e.g. the object representing the first position comes before the one representing the second positions). And so each ordinal occupies the position it represents.
However, we can define well-orderings that extend the natural ordering of the ordinal numbers. For example, we can place some other object r immediately after all the ordinals. But now the object r is left without a position. Since this collection is well-ordered, there should be an ordinal representing the position of r. But that cannot be: the ordinals have already been 'used up' to represent their own positions. This calls into question the coherence of our intuitive talk of ordering and positions.
The form of the paradox which appears under Burali-Forti's name in many textbooks of set theory goes something like this:
Consider the class of Von Neumann ordinals-transitive sets well-ordered by the membership relation, each one representing the ordinal giving the count of its own members ordered by ∈. Since it is easy to verify that for any two Von Neumann ordinals, one is a member of the other, and since the restriction of ∈ to this class is transitive and well-founded almost by definition, this class, if it were a set, would be another Von Neumann ordinal, representing the count of the whole ordinal sequence. But then it would contain itself (since it contains all Von Neumann ordinals) contradicting the earlier claim that it was well-ordered by ∈. Thus, the class of Von Neumann ordinals is not a set.
Stated in this way, Burali-Forti's paradox leads to an unproblematic theorem of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (henceforth ZFC), and indeed of much weaker set theories. The ordinals constructed in set theory do not form a set. For, such a set would be-absurdly-an ordinal greater than any ordinal in the set of all ordinals.
In what follows, we shall argue that the standard set-theoretic rendering of the paradox of Burali-Forti conceals the conceptual difficulty that the paradox discloses, and that this difficulty is, some hundred years after its discovery, still without any fully satisfactory resolution. In the course of our argument, we will propose an analysis of this paradox, and show how the extant approaches to the paradox can be helpfully classified by means of this analysis. Our classification will highlight one possible resolution to the paradox-an account of the ordinals along the lines of Russell's no class theory-which seems to be both promising, and neglected by the current literature. In the final sections of the paper, we will develop and motivate a no class theory of ordinals which is formally adequate to standard intuitions about ordinals, expresses a conception of ordinal number capable of resolving Burali-Forti's paradox, and offers a novel contribution to the longstanding program of reducing mathematics to higher-order logic.
Why set theory does not resolve the paradox of Burali-Forti
To see why the paradox of Burali-Forti is not resolved by set theory alone, it may be helpful to compare it to another paradox that set theory can in some sense resolve. A good example of such a paradox would be Cantor's paradox:
Consider the set of all sets, the universal set U. By Cantor's theorem, we know that the set of all the subsets of U, P(U) cannot be placed into one-to-one correspondence with U. Yet, there is obviously an embedding of U into P(U) (by mapping each set to its singleton), and of P(U) into U (by mapping each set to itself). So by the Schröder-Bernstein theorem, there is a one-to-one correspondence between U and P(U).
Most set theorists will say that this argument goes wrong in the very first sentence. There is no universal set.
It seems that ZFC supports this standard diagnosis. It licenses every other part of the paradoxical reasoning above, but does not prove that there is a universal set. So by process of elimination, the claim that there is a set of all sets must be rejected-and indeed, "by Cantor's paradox", it is a theorem that there is no such set. But diagnosing the paradoxical reasoning above by appealing to ZFC only pushes the problem back to the justification of ZFC. For, why should we think that ZFC is right to say there is no universal set? There are, after all, alternative set theories in which such a set is countenanced.
The solution to this trouble is to give a conception of set: a picture of the universe of sets on which our axioms and much of our naïve reasoning about sets can be seen to be justified. Such a picture helps fix a clear subject matter for the axioms, and elevate them from a set of so-far-consistent assertions to a well-motivated account of the nature of that subject matter.
The conception of set traditionally favored by set theorists who are in the business of justifying their axioms is called the iterative conception. Here is how Gödel describes it:
When theorems about all sets (or the existence of sets in general) are asserted, they can always be interpreted without any difficulty to mean that they hold for sets of integers as well as for sets of sets of integers, etc. (respectively, that there either exist sets of integers, or sets of sets of integers, or . . . etc., which have the asserted property). This concept of set, according to which a set is something obtainable from the integers (or some other well-defined objects) by iterated application of the operation "set of". . . has never led to any antinomy whatsoever; that is, the perfectly "naïve" and uncritical working with this concept of set has so far proved completely self-consistent. (Gödel 1964, 180) This is a description of an iterative hierarchy of sets that begins from the integers. ZFC is the theory of the iterative hierarchy of sets that begins from the empty set.
The iterative conception, when elaborated in sufficient detail, supports most or all of the axioms of ZFC. It also explains why there is no universal set. Such a set would have to contain itself. But a set containing itself cannot arise at any point in the accumulation process: each set is built out of previously built sets, and no set is built before it is built.
The iterative conception also explains why there is no set of all Von Neumann ordinals. The Von Neumann ordinals constructed at any given point in the accumulation process, when assembled into a set at the next stage, always form a new Von Neumann ordinal. So a stage never occurs at which all the Von Neumann ordinals are at previous stages. Hence, the Von Neumann ordinals are never available all at once to be assembled into a set.
Does this explanation of the fact that there is no set of all Von Neumann ordinals constitute a solution to the original paradox of Burali-Forti? We think not, at least in the sense that the paradox of Burali-Forti is not directly resolved by the iterative conception in the same way as Cantor's paradox is. We do not mean to deny that the iterative conception could be part of some solution to the paradox of Burali-Forti. But Cantor's paradox is about the properties of a certain set, whereas the paradox of Burali-Forti is about ordinal numbers. A conception of set, at least in isolation, suffices to address a paradox of the former kind but not of the latter kind. If ordinal numbers are not Von Neumann ordinals, there is a gap here that needs to be bridged before we can claim to have resolved the paradox. We need to be told why a feature of the represented structure (the progression of ordinal numbers) can be explained by features of a certain representational medium (the Von Neumann ordinals). In the next section, we offer some reasons to think that ordinal numbers are not Von Neumann ordinals.
Origins of the ordinal number concept
Are the ordinals literally the Von Neumann ordinals? No, for at least two reasons. First, the notion of transfinite iteration that gives us the iterative conception in which the Von Neumann ordinals are situated appears to presuppose ordinals-or something akin to them-to index the stages of the process. If we revise our usage to refer only to Von Neumann ordinals, we lose sight of the ordinals that give us the iterative conception. Second, even if one denies that the ordinals are presupposed or denies the iterative conception, say by embracing an alternative conception of set, the Von Neumann ordinals are still not the ordinals as they were historically conceived. One is free to adopt a new terminology on which ordinals are just Von Neumann ordinals. But to do so would be to disown the fruitful tradition that originally gave us the concept of ordinal number. In this section, we review some features of the tradition that will be important to our analysis of the paradox of Burali-Forti.
Let us begin by recalling a definition associated with cardinal numbers, rather than ordinal numbers. This is Hume's principle, the principle that the number of As is the same as the number of Bs, just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence between the As and the Bs. In symbols:
The left-hand side expresses the literal equality of an object, the number of As (denoted by the "number of" abstraction operator # applied to the variable A), to another object, the number of Bs. The right-hand side abbreviates the statement that there is a function witnessing the equinumerosity of A and B. While Frege sometimes gets credit for this principle-perhaps, ironically, because he was the first to attribute it to Hume (1884), perhaps because he indirectly showed how this principle, over second-order logic, has the strength of second-order Peano Arithmetic, or perhaps because he sometimes refers to it in the Grundlagen as "my definition"-its lineage appears to considerably predate the attribution.
It would take us much too far afield to fully explore Frege's sources and influences, although there's much to be said. 1 According to recent historical work by Paolo Mancosu, Frege here is at least partly influenced by the innovations of Grassmann's Ausdehnungslehre-originally published about forty years before Frege's Grundlangen-which includes a number of definitions by abstraction exactly analogous to Hume's principle. For example, Frege's definition of direction is as the thing that two parallel lines have in common (so that two directions are equal when two lines having them are parallel) can be found in texts by Grassmann, e.g. Grassmann 1844 and Grassmann 1846 (see Mancosu 2015 for details). Mancosu's work strongly suggests that this style of definition would likely have been recognizable to a reader of Frege's time.
And, indeed, the basic idea of definition by abstraction seemed to have been clear to Leibniz. 2 He explains his own use of an abstraction-like procedure in his correspondence with Clarke: 1 When Hume's principle is introduced in the Grundlagen, Frege alludes the work of others, both for the idea that number should be defined in terms of a one-to-one correspondence (Frege 1884, 73-74) , and for the idea that in general, a new type of entity can be introduced by giving sense to identity statements (like "the number of As is equal to the number of Bs") concerning that type of entity. (Frege ultimately rejected the latter claim.) Frege's allusion to the work of other mathematicians using one-to-one correspondence in the elucidation of the number concept mentions Cantor, Schröder, and Kossak. The reference to Cantor is especially important to what follows. 2 Leibniz at least indirectly influenced Frege and Grassmann. Indeed, both defend the adequacy of their definitions by abstraction in precisely the same way: by pointing to Leibniz. Frege quotes Leibniz's dictum that "Things are the same as each other when one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth" (Frege 1884, 76) and takes the justification of definition by abstraction to consist, as least in part, in showing that the abstracts obey this principle. Grassmann took himself I have here done much like Euclid, who, not being able to make his readers understand what ratio is absolutely in the sense of the geometricians, defines what are the same ratios. Thus in like manner, in order the explain what place is, I have been content to define what is the same place. (Leibniz 1989, 704) Leibniz is referring to Euclid's definition 5, from the fifth book of the Elements:
Magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the second and the third to the fourth, when if any equimultiples whatever be taken of the first and the third, and any equimultiples whatever of the second and the fourth, the former equimultiples alike exceed, alike are equal to, or alike fall short of, the latter equimultiples respectively taken in corresponding order. (Translated in Heath 1908, 114) We have approximately what one might call Euclid's principle: 3
So, in formulating Hume's principle, Frege had a number of influential antecedents. It should not be too surprising, then, that in 1878, six years before the publication of Frege's Grundlagen, Cantor offered the following definition of "power" or cardinal number:
If two well-defined manifolds M and N can be coordinated with each other univocally and completely, element by element (which, if possible in one way, can always happen in many others), we shall employ in the sequel the expression, that those manifolds have the same power. (Cantor 1878; see Ferreirós 2007, 188) Modulo the use of "manifolds" rather than Fregean concepts, this is just Hume's principle. So Cantor too was a part of the tradition described above-indeed Cantor writes admiringly of Grassmann's style of definition (Cantor 1883, 897) .
We have now described the concept of cardinal number given in Hume's principle and the intellectual tradition from which that concept emerged. To summarize the crucial point: definition by abstraction was at least a recognized technique around the time of Cantor's greatest innovations and was part of Cantor's methodological repertoire. We wish to claim that Burali-Forti's paradox is best viewed as a paradox within this practice of concept formation, rather than a paradox within the concept of set. With to be improving on Leibniz's geometrical calculus by introducing new symbols (in hindsight, abstraction operators) that would allow one to subsume the transfer of properties between congruent geometrical figures to simple operations of substitution of identicals. As in Frege, this maneuver is justified by a Leibnizian conception of equality "in which we just set as simply equal that which we can substitute for the other in each proposition." (Grassmann 1844, 321) . Whether Leibniz's idea of definition by abstraction had a direct influence on either figure, or whether Leibniz's influence is confined to the laws of identity, remains an interesting historical question which we do not attempt to answer here. 3 There is an exegetical issue concerning the use of the identity sign in (EP) . In proposition 11, Euclid proves that it is legitimate to reason with the notion of sameness of ratio as one does with the notion of identity. that background in place, let us return from the concept of cardinal number to our original target: the concept of ordinal number.
The definition of ordinal number we are interested in seems to first have been systematically presented in Georg Cantor's Grundlagen in 1883; he arrived at the concept over the month following his September 1882 meeting with Dedekind (see Ferreirós 2007, 269) . 4 The critical idea, likely stimulated by conversation with Dedekind, is the possibility of taking the order-theoretic aspects of numbers-their positions in the number sequence-as their essential or defining features, as Dedekind was inclined to do. While Cantor would continue to maintain that ordinary numbers are essentially cardinals-essentially connected with considerations of size, rather than order-he was not blind to the intelligibility of Dedekind's point of view.
To capture the concept of number connected with order (Cantor used the term Anzahl to express this concept), one wants a definition that establishes that order-types correspond to numbers. Roughly, this is a principle about ordinals requiring that every well-ordering R is represented by an ordinal number determined entirely by the order type of R. In effect, one introduces ordinals as invariants of ordered collections, just as one introduces cardinals as invariants of bare unstructured collections. The obvious definition is given by the following principle of ordinal abstraction:
Now the left-hand side expresses the literal equality of an object, the ordinal of R 1 (denoted by the "ordinal of" abstraction operator ord applied to the variable R 1 ), to another object, the ordinal of R 2 . The right-hand side abbreviates the statement that there is a one-to-one order preserving correspondence between well-orderings (an order isomorphism). The quantifiers range over well-orderings. 5 The obvious definition is, indeed, precisely what Cantor proposed:
Two well-ordered sets are now said to be of the same Anzahl (with respect to their given successions) when a reciprocal one-to-one correlation of them is possible such that, if E and F are any two elements of the one set, and E 1 and F 1 , are the corresponding elements of the other, then the position of E and F in the succession of the first set always agrees with the position of E 1 , and F 1 in the succession of the second set (i.e. when E precedes F in the succession of the first set, then E 1 , also precedes F 1 , in the succession of the second set). (Cantor 1883, 885) And it is this definition that leads to the original Burali-Forti paradox. 4 But it should of course be noted that the concept of ordinal, as a counting number rather than a measure of cardinality, obviously predates Cantor, and the concept of an infinite ordinal is prefigured by Cantor's work on trigonometric series, where terms behaving like names for transfinite ordinals appear in formal manipulations as uninterpreted "symbols of infinity". 5 If one makes the restriction of the quantifiers explicit, the result is:
where WO(R) abbreviates the statement that R is a well-ordering (see Appendix A for a formal definition).
The Paradox of Burali-Forti
In his paper on Cantor's ordinal number concept, Burali-Forti (1897) gives us the following definition of ordinal number (in Peano's notation)
What this means, essentially, is that, if (u, h), (v, h) are pairs each consisting of a collection and a wellordering of that collection, then their ordinal numbers are equal so long as their orderings are isomorphic. This is, in effect, just a notational variant on our earlier principle of ordinal abstraction. And it was on this basis-not on the basis of any formalization within set theory-that Burali-Forti outlined the argument that now bears his name. Burali-Forti's original presentation is marred by a number of difficulties. The most serious of these is that his theorem turns on a misunderstanding of Cantor's definition of a well-ordering. Burali-Forti seems to have understood this to mean "ordering with no descending ω-sequence under the predecessor relation" rather than "ordering with no descending ω-sequence under the less-than relation". So rather than claiming to have shown that ordinal abstraction is inconsistent, Burali-Forti merely claimed to have established, by his paradox, a reductio of the claim that the "ordinals" are linearly ordered. Others, however-most notably Russell and Poincaré-soon gave Burali-Forti's argument a sharper edge. 6 Combining the findings of Burali-Forti, Russell, and Jourdain, the following paradox emerges. Our presentation of the paradoxical reasoning relies on second-order logic to capture talk about relations. This is to a certain extent a rational reconstruction. We do not strive to give a fully faithful rendering of the exact thoughts of the different historical actors. In addition to providing a simple and illuminating setting, the second-order framework has the advantage of letting us see the continuity between the origins of the paradox and contemporary work on abstraction principles. Argument Sketch. There is a natural way of comparing two ordinals. One ordinal α is greater than another β if a well-ordering R 1 represented by α is "longer" than a well-ordering R 2 represented by β (that is, if R 2 is isomorphic to a proper initial segment of R 1 ).
Using standard higher-order resources, one can demonstrate that there is a relation < on the ordinals corresponding to this notion of greater-than, and that this relation is a well-ordering (this was proved by Jourdain; see his 1904 article). The comprehension axioms used in the argument are impredicativethese are instances in which the comprehending formula contains quantifiers over properties or relations. So one must at this stage assume that to impredicative definitions there correspond relations, and furthermore, that a single existential quantifier in a comprehension axiom can range over all such relations. For the relation < to have the desired interpretation, it's also necessary to read the first-order quantifiers in the 6 The first presentation of the argument as a paradox came in 1903, in Russell's Principles of Mathematics. There, Russell reconstructs Burali-Forti's argument, but with the correct Cantorian definition of ordinal number. Apparently unaware of the difference between Burali-Forti and Cantor's definitions, Russell points out that one can easily establish that every initial segment of the ordinal number sequence is well-ordered (and indicates that he believes Cantor's proof that the ordinals are linearly ordered is correct). Like Burali-Forti, however, he ultimately views the argument as a reductio, this time of the claim that the entire ordinal sequence is well-ordered-an assertion that Russell found intuitive, but not impossible to abandon. Jourdain's proof that the ordinals are, in fact, well-ordered would later force Russell to take more aggressive measures in his excision of the inconsistency (see Moore and Garciadiego 1981 for details). comprehension scheme as ranging over absolutely all objects. (These presuppositions will be important later.)
Once we have the relation <, for any ordinal α, we can then show (using only a more harmless form of comprehension) that there is a relation that restricts < to the ordinals less than α. Call this relation < α . If one grants that < α lies within the domain of ordinal abstraction-in particular that it is a well-ordering of objects, and so that ordinals are objects-then it is not difficult to prove that for any ordinal α, α is the representative of < α .
By an application of O-AB-again, taking the second-order quantifiers in this principle to range over all relations-one has that to <, there corresponds an ordinal, which we can call Ω. This means that Ω is the representative of <. But, by the previous fact, Ω is also the representative of < Ω . Since by definition < Ω is a proper initial segment of <, the represenative of < Ω is less than the represenative of <. In other words, Ω < Ω, which contradicts the fact that < is a well-ordering. QED A careful formalization of the proof above-rather too long and involved to be included here, although it is outlined in Appendix B-establishes that O-AB is inconsistent over second-order logic. The modeltheoretic unsatisfiability of O-AB (in a standard model) is a well-known fact (see, e.g., Hodes 1986 , Cook 2003 , Linnebo and Pettigrew 2014 . A proof of the principle's inconsistency is surprisingly intricate. 7 We hope to provide a useful reference by laying out an explicit proof, which is so far lacking in the literature.
If we are to make a proper philosophical assessment of the paradox, we must make its assumptions fully explicit. A model-theoretic proof of the unsatisfiability of O-AB in a standard model of secondorder logic, however, already builds in far-reaching assumptions about quantification and second-order ontology. This is why a proof-theoretic perspective on the paradox promises to be more philosophically illuminating. A formalization of the paradox reveals its dependence on two assumptions, which we drew attention to in the proof sketch above:
Second-order comprehension
Every open formula defines a property or a relation.
First principle of ordinals (O-AB)
Every well-ordering R is represented by an ordinal determined entirely by the order type of R.
Moreover, the paradox relies on three presuppositions:
First-order absolute generality It is possible to quantify over absolutely all ordinals.
Second-order absolute generality
It is possible to quantify over absolutely all relations.
Second principle of ordinals
Ordinals are objects representing well-orderings.
Each of these assumptions and presuppositions underwrites one or more crucial steps in the proof above. The first principle of ordinals motivates O-AB, which is used to establish that < is a well-ordering, to prove that ord(< α ) = α, and to reason about Ω. Instances of second-order comprehension are used throughout the proof that the ordinals are well-ordered. In particular, as we noted, one needs instances in which the comprehending formula contains quantifiers over properties or relations, i.e. impredicative instances of comprehension. It turns out that a full formalization of our proof that < is a well-ordering requires what is called Σ 1 1 -comprehension. 8 Moreover, the definition of < requires an instance of comprehension that is not only impredicative but viciously so.
Intuitively, an instance of comprehension is viciously impredicative if the comprehending formula must be taken to quantify over the very relation that it defines. But this is what is required in the final stages of the paradox. The defining condition of the relation < is that for any two ordinals α and β , α < β just in case there are two well-orderings R 1 and R 2 , such that α is a representative of R 1 , β is a representative of R 2 , and R 1 is isomorphic to a proper initial segment of R 2 . We conclude the paradox by moving from the fact that < Ω is proper initial segment of < to the assertion that Ω < Ω. But this inference involves taking R 1 to be < Ω and R 2 to be <. So the relation being defined, <, must be in the range of the existential quantifier binding R 2 in the comprehending formula.
Finally, throughout the proof, the use of classical inference rules for first-order and second-order quantifiers presupposes a fixed domain for each type of variables to range over. If different occurrences of any given quantifier ranged over different domains, some rules of classical logic would have to be given up. For instance, universal instantiation would fail, since there would be no guarantee that a given universal quantifier would include in its range objects introduced by existential quantifiers occurring elsewhere. This is illustrated by a well-known response to Russell's paradox. The following sentence is at the core of the paradox:
One might resist the reasoning that leads from this sentence to contradiction by interpreting the range of the existential quantifier as wider than the range of the universal quantifier ranges (see, e.g., Parsons 1974b , Parsons 1974a , Glanzberg 2004 , and Glanzberg 2006 . A more perspicuous notation would thus 8 Roughly, an instance of comprehension is said to be Σ 1 1 if it involves a formula that is equivalent to one headed by a block of second-order existential quantifiers and containing no other second-order quantifier. It is Π 1 1 if the relevant formula is headed by a block of second-order universal quantifiers. An instance of comprehension is said to be ∆ 1 1 if it is both Σ 1 1 and Π 1 1 . The use of Σ 1 1 -comprehension shows up, for example, in Lemma 2 of Appendix B asserting that if every proper initial segment of one well-ordering R 1 is isomorphic to a proper initial segment of another R 2 , then R 1 is isomorphic to an initial segment of R 2 -this intuitively requires a union of given isomorphisms, which requires Σ 1 1 -comprehension. It's plausible that no comprehension principle weaker than Σ 1 1 will support the lemma. For one cannot prove that for any two well-orderings, one is isomorphic to an initial segment of the other (*)
using only ∆ 1 1 -comprehension. But (*) is logical consequence of the lemma. The unprovability of (*) from ∆ 1 1 -comprehension follows from the fact that, in the language of second-order arithmetic, (*) is equivalent over RCA 0 to AT R 0 (Simpson 2009, 198) , which is strictly stronger than the theory of ∆ 1 1 -comprehension (Simpson 2009, 338-345) . However, the conclusion that the lemma requires Σ 1 1 -comprehension is not immediate owing to the presence of O-AB. For O-AB might add enough strength to theory of ∆ 1 1 -comprehension to allows us to derive (*).
be:
Although in the course of an argument, one might consider a witness, r, to the existential quantifier above, such a witness could lie outside of the range of the universal quantifier. This makes the inference to r ∈ r ↔ r / ∈ r illegitimate, since the universally bound x cannot be be instantiated by r. First-order and second-order absolute generality secure a fixed domain for first-order and second-order quantifiers. For if all quantifiers range over the maximal domain, no disagreement about quantifier range is possible. An intuitive picture of domain expansion that has been found appealing comes from thinking of the more inclusive domains on the model of possible worlds. In some cases, the logic of domain expansion can be thereby subsumed under standard modal logic. This idea will be relevant below. Now that we have identified the assumptions of the paradox, a solution will begin by rejecting one or more of these assumptions. And indeed, the natural solutions of the paradox that have been proposed are cleanly classified by which assumption they reject. 9
Options
There is a rich set of available responses to the paradox. In this section, we introduce and discuss some of them. In the next section, we focus on our preferred response, which is inspired by Russell's no class theory and, more recently, by work of Harold Hodes and Kevin Klement. After that, we defend this 'eliminative' approach from a number of potential objections. We think that the existence of such a rich range of options to deal with the paradox is of great importance for a proper philosophical assessment of its solutions.
Restricting second-order comprehension
We have noted that at several points in the reasoning of the paradox we appeal to instances of the axiom scheme of comprehension. Perhaps these instances of comprehension are the crucial assumptions that drive the paradox. Russell himself observed that this is one of the conclusions that may be drawn from the paradox. He suggested two possible criteria for problematic comprehension instances. According to the first, an instance is to be rejected if it determines a property or relation whose size is too big. Since comprehension on the relation < leads to paradox, one infers that this relation is too big to be comprehended. Since an instance of comprehension introducing < is essential to the argument above, the paradox is averted (Russell 1905, 43-44) . The paradox may simply be regarded as a proof that < is too big to be comprehended.
Russell, however, forcefully rejected the limitation of size approach.
A great difficulty of [limitation of size] is that it does not tell us how far up the series of ordinals it is legitimate to go. It might happen that ω was already illegitimate: in that case all proper classes would be finite. . . Or it might happen that ω 2 was illegitimate, or ω ω or ω 1 or any other ordinal having no immediate predecessor. We need further axioms before we can tell where the series begins to be illegitimate. . . (Russell 1905, 44) Russell's point seems to be that one can say very little about what kinds of relations are "too big"-many different size restrictions seem to suffice to block the paradox, and there is no principled way of making a choice between them. 10 One might try to avoid this objection by implementing the limitation of size approach in something like the following way. Perhaps a property or relation is "too big" if its extension or field, respectively, is too big to form a set. Since set theory is supposed to be an absolutely general theory of collections (individuated extensionally), one might think that it would be a good guide to what sizes of collections are possible. This, of course, presupposes a background set theory. Formally speaking, such a presupposition is unproblematic. However, from a philosophical perspective it is unsatisfactory, for the reasons we have discussed above. On this approach, the ordinals become just shadows of their set-theoretic surrogates. But the paradox of Burali-Forti, as we insisted, is first and foremost a problem about concept formation, not about sets.
More sophisticated developments of the limitation of size approach that address these difficulties can be found in Linnebo 2010 , Studd 2016 , and Florio and Linnebo in progress. The idea is to develop a notion of definiteness and to hold that the axiom scheme of comprehenion must be curtailed when dealing with indefinite domains.
According to the second criterion proposed by Russell, an instance of comprehension is to be rejected if the comprehending formula is "complicated and recondite" (Russell 1905, 38) . Russell dubs this approach to the paradox the zig-zag theory, and adopts zigzaginess to denote the feature of formulas that renders them ineligible for comprehension. His original exposition leaves open just how zigzaginess is to be defined. One proposal for spelling out the precise nature of zigzaginess was given by Poincaré. He writes:
[T]he definitions which should be regarded as not predicative [read: ineligible for comprehension] are those which contain a vicious circle. [...] Is this what Russell calls 'zigzaginess'? (Poincaré 1912, 534) By 'vicious circle' Poincaré means an appeal to the very notion being defined. Poincaré's example is the paradoxical class of Richard: the set of all the decimal numbers definable by a finite number of words. Since this set is countable, a new decimal not contained in the set can easily be defined in a finite number of words. Thus accepting Richard's paradoxical class leads us to paradox. The problem with the phrase that introduced Richard's class is that its denotation depends on which decimal numbers are definable. However, this in turn depends on what classes are denoted by phrases of English. Thus the phrase that introduces Richard's class depends for its denotation upon what classes are denoted by phrases of English, including itself. Until a denotation for 'Richard's class' is given, a denotation for 'Richard's class' cannot be determined. And this is a case of vicious circularity.
The vicious circle in the phrase defining Richard's class derives from the fact that the phrase contains an implicit quantifier over definitions. The solution is to ban classes introduced by phrases like this. In second-order logic, instances of comprehension can be regarded as definitions of properties or relations. Hence, in this context, Poincaré's idea is usually rendered as a ban on impredicative instances of comprehension.
Allen Hazen (1986) has advocated a modified form of Poincaré's response, where one also allows ramified instances of comprehension-roughly one ramifies by distinguishing between different "levels" of variables and allowing comprehension schemes to introduce relations at a certain level of this hierarchy if they contain only quantifiers ranging over relations at lower levels. This generalizes a predicative approach, since a predicative approach amounts to a ramified approach that includes only level zero variables. Hazen remarks that, owing to its vicious impredicativity, < cannot be defined in the ramified setting. He speculates that, as a result, the paradox can be avoided.
A predicative or ramified restriction of comprehension blocks the paradox of Burali-Forti at more than one point. As noted above, the definition of the less-than relation on ordinals (<) is impredicative. Of course, blocking one derivation of an inconsistency does little to guarantee that there is no derivation of an inconsistency to be found. One might, therefore, ask what can be shown in general about the safety of a predicative theory of ordinal abstraction.
The predicative approach to ensuring consistency has recently been the subject of a great deal of research in connection with neologicism. The basic results indicate that both the predicative and ramified fragment of Frege's system in Grundgesetze are consistent and interpret Robinson arithmetic (Heck 1996) . Moreover, given Frege's definition of number, the resulting system proves Hume's principle (Heck 1996) . 11 Ferreira and Wehmeier (2002) have shown that consistency is preserved even if we adjoin ∆ 1 1 -comprehension; and furthermore, Ferreira (2005) has recently shown that by adjoining an axiom of reducibility for finite concepts to the ramified predicative fragment of Frege's system, we can produce a theory which relatively interprets ACA 0 (the predicative second-order theory extending full elementary Peano arithmetic). Most recently, work by Sean Walsh on the connection between predicative abstraction and Gödel's constructible universe has yielded an extension of the theorem by Ferreira and Wehmeier: in the presence of full second-order comprehension for "pure" formulas of second-order logic together with ∆ 1 1 -comprehension for formulas containing non-logical vocabulary, an arbitrary collection of abstraction principles is consistent so long as these principle are based on formulas that provably express equivalence relations on concepts.
Walsh's result establishes that a non-trivial strengthening of the predicative theory of ordinal abstraction is consistent. On the one hand, this result offers an insight. On the one hand, it presents a challenge. The insight is this: since the impredicative uses of comprehension occurring early in the paradox of Burali-Forti are pure (and therefore, by Walsh's result, are jointly consistent with O-AB), the locus of inconsistency can be seen to lie with the viciously impredicative definition of the relation <. If a traditional predicativist wishes, however, to take advantage of this insight and to endorse pure forms of impredicative comprehension, then they must provide a clarification of the concept of vicious impredicativity which motivates the different treatment of pure and impure instances of impredicative second-order comprehension.
Without such a clarification, the traditional predicativist, to avoid arbitrariness, has no choice but to re-nounce impredicative comprehension altogether, thus sacrificing standard theorems about well-orderings that rely on impredicative but pure comprehension instances (see footnote 8). This should perhaps not come as a surprise. Historically, the main objection to predicativism is that it must abandon standard theorems of classical mathematics. Those who regard this sacrifice as significant have good reason to look elsewhere for a solution to the paradox of Burali-Forti.
Rejecting the first principle of ordinals
The paradox may also be blocked by giving up the first principle of ordinals, namely the principle that every well-ordering R is represented by an ordinal determined entirely by the order type of R. Let us explore how this could be done. One could retain the principle that all well-orderings have representatives but deny that they are entirely determined by the order-type of the associated well-orderings. While allowing that non-isomorphic well-orderings have distinct representatives, it could be maintained that isomorphic well-orderings need not have the same ordinal as representative. It could even be allowed, perhaps, that fixing a unique wellordering fails to determine a single ordinal. Unfortunately, this approach does not get off the ground in the presence of an appropriate principle of choice. 12 A better option for rejecting the first principle of ordinals is to give up the assumption that all wellorderings have a representative. On this view, we retain second-order comprehension but exempt certain well-orderings from having a representative. If a background set theory is available, one could exempt well-orderings that are too big to form a set. Alternatively, one could take inspiration from Cantor's remarks on inconsistent multiplicities or from the literature on neologicism and allow only abstracta of properties that are not too big. For Cantor, a property is too big if it has a subproperty of the same size as the ordinals-since the ordinals are an 'inconsistent multiplicity' in his terminology. For the neologicist, a property is too big if it is equinumerous with the universe. The resulting restriction of the first-principle of ordinals has been dubbed Size-Restricted Ordinal Abstraction Principle in Cook 2003.
The high cost of this line of response to the paradox lies in the fact that the first principle of ordinals expresses the characterizing property of an ordinal number and thus it appears to be central to our understanding of ordinals. If one wishes to avoid doing violence to the concept of ordinal, one should not abandon this principle lightly.
Rejecting first-order absolute generality
A useful way to think of the role of first-order absolute generality in the paradox is as a principle guaranteeing a uniform reading of the first-order quantifiers. As noted above, the proof makes use of classical inference rules for the quantifiers, which fail if different quantifiers are assigned different ranges. If absolutely general quantification is possible, then the quantifiers in the paradoxical reasoning can be read as absolutely general and therefore uniform. In particular, such a reading of the quantifiers prevents a solution to the paradox which postulates a domain expansion.
Some have concluded that real lesson of Burali-Forti's paradox is that absolute generality is not possible. Geoffrey Hellman writes:
What has emerged, however, is the point that we have a choice: either we stick with the above instance of 'absolute generality' and give up on desideratum (3) [i.e. the first principle of ordinals], or we seek to enforce the latter but deny [...] that it makes sense to refer to 'absolutely all ordinals', or 'absolutely all well-order relations'. (Hellman 2011, 633) So Hellman maintains that if we are to uphold the first principle of ordinals, then we must give up absolute generality. How does Hellman's rejection of absolute generality translate into a solution of the paradox?
Simply denying absolute generality is not enough. Absolute generality together with the other principles identified above suffice for the contradiction. But slightly weaker principles might suffice as well, provided that those principles license a uniform reading of the quantifiers. For a satisfying diagnosis of the paradox, one needs to explain where and why we have a variation in the reading of quantifiers figuring in the paradox. Hellman responds to this challenge by postulating a domain expansion captured in modal terms.
He states the first principle of ordinals in roughly the same way as we do: "any well-ordering, as a relation, should be represented by a unique ordinal" (Hellman (2011), 632) . However, he makes it clear that the principle needs to be read with care. In particular, the quantifiers should be read as modalized and, as he emphasizes, the second-order variables should be interpreted plurally.
The modalized version of first principle of ordinals becomes that principle that, necessarily, for any two well-orderings, there could be an ordinal determined entirely by the order type of those wellorderings. A formal rendering of this principle might go as follows:
The exact details of its proper representation will depend on the system of modal logic one favors for reasoning about domain expansions. But the above formalization does at least clarify Hellman's insistence on a plural reading of the variables. For Hellman, a well-ordering is just some ordered-pairs with the relevant properties. This has the effect of ensuring an extensional reading to the second-order variables. Pluralities, unlike properties, are thought to have their members necessarily. Hellman needs to ensure an extensional reading of the second-order variables. An intensional reading would reinstate the paradox in the expanded domain. If R 1 and R 2 could be instantiated with the relation < on the ordinals, intensionally construed, then O-AB 3 would entail that, in the expanded domain, the relation < has an ordinal. Once it is admitted, in this way, that the well-ordering of the ordinals has an ordinal, the rest of the reasoning of the paradox is familiar.
Note that, even with respect to the specific reading of the paradox at hand, there are-perhaps inevitably-sacrifices that Hellman is forced to make. He can retain the first principle of ordinals only in the modalized sense, not in the original one. Of course, Hellman could respond by suggesting that the modalized sense is a natural one and the first principle should have been read this way all along. However, if this is true, then one wonders why a modalized reading should not be given to the other assumptions of the paradox. Specifically, Hellman cannot allow a modal reading of second-order comprehension. Such a reading isn't plausible given a plural interpretation of the second-order variables. 13 This might come as 13 Consider the following modalized instance of comprhension
While it acceptable on the intensional reading-it asserts that there could be a property tracking self-identity across worldsit is not on the extensional reading. On this reading, it asserts that there could be some things encompassing all possible relief to Hellman, since a modalized version of second-order comprehension in combination with O-AB 3 allows one to reconstruct the paradox. But it does commit Hellman to accepting that, in spite of similarity of syntax and usage, the meanings of the quantifiers in the first principle of ordinals and in second-order comprehension are radically different. Hellman might, again, reply that given his plural reading of the second-order variables, one should expect modalized comprehension to fail. Since the modalized reading of second-order comprehension is obviously false, the non-modal reading dominates.
So, on Hellman's reading, we compromise in various ways on the first principle of ordinals and on second-order comprehension. Hellman could argue that, at least in the context of his particular reading, these compromises are not significant. But this raises a more fundamental problem. If we grant that Hellman has established the consistency of a reading of the assumptions of the paradox, this does not provide a resolution to the inconsistency found in the original practice of concept formation described above. In other words, we may wonder whether the move to a plural reading of the second-order variables and a modalized reading of the quantifiers re-directs our attention to one manifestation of the paradox while failing to get to the heart of the problem. Ceteris paribus, a solution to the paradox that does not require a special reading of the quantifiers and variables would be preferable.
In any case, there is one additional difficulty for Hellman's approach. It is unnecessarily concessive: it gives up more than is required. Recall the distinction between first-order and second-order absolute generality. First-order absolute generality secures the possibility of quantifying over absolutely all ordinals, while second-order absolute generality secures the possibility of quantifying over the plurality of all ordinals. Hellman rejects first-order absolute generality, since he denies that we can quantify over all ordinals. This is what lies behind his reformulation of the first principle of ordinals in terms of domain expansion. Since Hellman construes second-order variables as pluralities, he also rejects second-order absolute generality. Given that pluralities depend on their members, if we cannot quantify over all ordinals, we cannot quantify over the plurality of all ordinals.
As we will show in the next section, so long as one abandons second-order absolute generality, one can in fact retain first-order absolute generality along with the other assumptions of the paradox (see Shapiro 2003 and Shapiro 2007) . In this sense Hellman's approach gives up more than is required. Abandoning second-order absolute generality is what does the work. Ceteris paribus, an approach that avoids this formally unnecessary concession would be preferable.
Rejecting second-order absolute generality
An alternative, less concessive response to the paradox uses domain expansions, but only relative to the second-order domain. The intuitive idea is that, while the first-order domain is absolute general, the second-order domain does not include absolutely all second-order entities. Instead, we have an increasingly inclusive series of second-order domains accessible by domain expanding quantifiers (for alternative implementations of this line of response to the paradox, see the 'thin straw' of Shapiro 2007) . Following Hellman, we construe the second-order variables extensionally-we assume that second-order entities have their members necessarily.
It is useful to introduce this new approach by means of a model-theoretic comparison with Hellman's position. A natural way to model Hellman's modal axioms is to read the modal operators in terms of possible worlds and to take these worlds to be the logical-mathematical possibilities corresponding to the self-identical objects. This is in tension with Hellman's principle that there could always be more ordinals.
various V κ of the iterative hierarchy of sets. The accessibility relation is given by this rule: V α accesses V β if and only if V α is a subset of V β . We should emphasize that this is only a toy model of Hellman's axioms. Not every feature of the model is part of Hellman's account. In particular, though in the model ordinals are identified with Von Neumann ordinals, Hellman need not endorse this identification.
Hellman's axioms come out true in any world in this model. As an illustration, consider V ω , the hereditarily finite sets. This would correspond to a possibility in which the first-order domain is V ω and the second-order domain is V ω+1 , i.e. the set of all subsets of V ω . In this context, the first principle of ordinals amounts to the claim that, for any well-ordering R in V ω+1 , there is a V κ containing a Von Neumann ordinal isomorphic to R. Given the axiom of replacement, it is easy to verify that this claim is true. Therefore, the first principle of ordinals is validated.
On this interpretation, Hellman's rejection of modalized second-order comprehension amounts to the requirement that, at a world w, the second-order quantifiers range only over subsets of the V κ corresponding to w. The restriction on the first-order quantifiers amounts to the requirement that, at a world w, the first-order quantifiers range only over elements of the V κ corresponding to w. Given this constraint on the quantifiers, second-order comprehension is true at each world.
One could modify this interpretation to "open up" the first-order quantifiers, letting them range over the entire iterative hierarchy, while keeping the restriction on the second-order quantifiers. The result would be another model in which the first-order domain of every logico-mathematical possibility is absolutely general: it is the set-theoretic universe V . The second-order domain of each possibility, however, is not absolutely general. In particular, at the world corresponding to V κ , the second-order domain consists only of the subsets of V κ . The picture is the following: while the domain of objects remains the same, the domain of concepts expands as we move from one logico-mathematical possibility to another. Importantly, the first principle of ordinals is retained, since it is true at every world that, for each well-ordering in the second-order domain, there is a corresponding ordinal in the absolutely general first-order domain.
It might be thought that the fact that this approach does not yield the standard comprehension scheme is a disadvantage. However, the semantic reason for the failure of standard comprehension is not that we don't have all the second-order objects we would otherwise have. It's that we have more first-order objects-we have absolutely all the sets in V . By owning up to these, a weakness that already existed in the modal comprehension scheme is made evident. A way to recover some comprehension would be to enrich the expressive resources of the object language. For example, if one adds the set-theoretic membership relation to the object language, then the following scheme of comprehension is true at every world:
where κ ranges over any cardinal (or ordinal) set-theoretically defined. Of course, this has the disadvantage of depending on the assumption that the structure of the underlying first-order domain is isomorphic to the iterative hierarchy. This difficulty can be overcome by revising the approach, for example, in the following way. Instead of letting the second-order domain of each world be the subsets of some V κ , we could let it be all subsets of cardinality less than κ. This yields a purely logical form of comprehension. Note that, in first-order logic, one can write down a formula ∃ n x ϕ(x) expressing the fact that there are n things falling under the formula ϕ(x), for any finite n. Pure second-order logic affords us the resources to express more cardinality facts of this kind. For instance, we one can write down a formula ∃ κ x ϕ(x) expressing the fact that there are κ-many things falling under the formula ϕ(x), where κ is ℵ n for any finite n. The comprehension scheme now available is the following:
where κ and ϕ(x) are such that ∃ κ x ϕ(x) is expressible in the way described just above. This amounts, in effect, to a version of the limitation of size approach originally suggested by Russell (see section 3.1). It has the advantage of avoiding any dependence on assumptions about the structure of the underlying first-order domain. Furthermore, it improves on the limitation of size approach by avoiding the arbitrary choice of size that worried Russell (see again section 3.1).
The two proposals just sketched are not the only ways to deny second-order absolute generality while retaining first-order absolute generality. To emphasize the key feature of this style of solution, we call it the V -V κ approach.
The following chart provides a summary of the responses to the paradox surveyed so far.
Full second-order First principle Second principle First-order Second-order Comprehension of ordinals of ordinals AG AG
Restricting comprehension ?
Rejecting the first principle of ordinals Hellman's modal approach ?
We have marked some entries with a question mark to indicate that it is contentious whether the assumption is upheld. The first question mark arises because one might insist that restricting comprehension restores consistency by preventing us from talking about properties that do exist. The second question mark indicates that Hellman loses intensional forms of comprehension. Since he retains extensional forms of intra-world comprehension, we do not count this as abandoning comprehension altogether. The common feature of these responses is that they all uphold the second principle of ordinals, namely the principle that ordinals are objects. We now want to explore a neglected response that denies this principle.
An alternative approach
The approach we want to explore rejects the principle that ordinals are objects. The key idea is that, while similar on the surface to talk about objects, talk about ordinals does not directly make assertions about objects. Rather, talk of ordinals conveys higher-order logical content in a sense to be made precise below. Three sources of inspiration for this approach to the paradox are Russell's no class theory and, more recently, Harold Hodes's views on the content of arithmetical discourse (Hodes 1986) , and Kevin Klement's work on arithmetic and abstraction principles (Klement forthcoming).
The function of Russell's no class theory is to eliminate apparent reference to classes by interpreting such reference in terms of a higher-order language. This is how Russell himself describes the aim of the theory:
The theory of classes which I set forth in my Principles was avowedly unsatisfactory. I did not, at that time, see any way of stating the elementary propositions of Arithmetic without employing the notion of "class". I have, however, since that time discovered that it is possible to give an interpretation to all propositions which verbally employ classes, without assuming that there really are such things as classes at all. [...] That it is meaningless [...] to regard a class as being or not being a member of itself, must be assumed for the avoidance of a more mathematical contradiction; but I cannot see that this could be meaningless if there were such things as classes.[...] The general contention that classes are a mere façon de parler has, of course, been often advanced, but it has not been accompanied by an exact account of what this manner of speaking really means, or by an interpretation of arithmetic in accordance with this contention [...] . (Russell 1910, 376) Here Russell highlights the indispensability of the no class theory for the resolution of the paradox that bears his name. As early as 1905, he suggested that the no class theory could also be deployed against the paradox of Burali-Forti (Russell 1905 ).
Russell's key idea is to reinterpret propositions that verbally employ classes. Frege, likewise, seem to have arrived at the conclusion that some reconstruction of assertions that superficially employ the number concept would be the key to understanding mathematical language. Less than two years before his death, Frege wrote in a diary:
From our earliest education onwards we are so accustomed to using the word 'number' and the number-words that we do not regard our way of using them as something that stands in need of a justification. To the mathematicians it appears beneath their dignity to concern themselves with such childish matters. But one finds amongst them the most different and contradictory statements about number and numbers. Indeed, when one has been occupied with these questions for a long time, one comes to suspect that our way of using language is misleading, that number-words are not proper names of objects at all and words like 'number', 'square number' and the rest are not concept-words; and that consequently a sentence like 'Four is a square number' simply does not express that an object is subsumed under a concept, and so just cannot be construed like the sentence 'Sirus is a fixed star'. But how then is it to be construed? (diary entry dated March 24, 1924; see Frege 1979, 263) Hodes calls the last line of this passage Frege's 'deathbed question'. He answers it in the spirit of Russell's no class theory by showing how to construe arithmetical discourse as a way of coding talk about a certain type of higher-order quantifier. On this view, arithmetical discourse becomes a special sort of fictional discourse: numbers are fictions "created" with a special purpose, to encode numerical object-quantifiers and thereby enable us to "pull down" a fragment of third-order logic, dressing it in first-order clothing. (Hodes 1986, 144) The usefulness of this discourse lies in the fact that first-order logic is familiar and tractable, while thirdorder logic is "notationally messy and logically complex" (Hodes 1986, 144) . Klement (forthcoming) recognizes that something in the vein of the no class theory can be used to eliminate reference to entities introduced via abstraction principles. He proposes a general method to regard talk of abstracta as mere abbreviation. In particular, Klement shows that Hume's principle and each axiom of second-order Peano Arithmetic, with the exception of the successor axiom, can be regarded as abbreviations for validities of third-order logic.
We would like to take the no class approach back to its original Russellian application to the resolution of the paradoxes. In particular, we would like to provide an interpretation of talk of ordinals without assuming, to put it in Russell's terms, that there are such things as ordinals. On this interpretation, assertions about ordinals become ways of conveying higher-order logical content, just as for Hodes assertions about natural numbers encode higher-order information about numerical object-quantifiers. Our decoding of ordinal talk involves construing ordinals as given by abstraction principles, and then showing how to reduce ordinal abstraction and its consequences to validities of third-order logic as Klement does to Hume's Principle. Unlike Hodes and Klement, however, we face a potentially inconsistent mathematical discourse. Here the no class theory serves not only to clarify the function of the discourse in question but also to witness its consistency.
The no class conception of ordinals
The no class approach denies the second principle of ordinals. The task for the no class approach is-to paraphrase Russell-to give an interpretation to all propositions which verbally employ ordinals, without assuming that there really are such things as ordinals at all. How might this be accomplished?
Concretely, our challenge is to interpret the ordinal abstraction operator and, eventually, quantification over ordinals. It is useful to begin with the case of identity statements between ordinals presented by the abstraction operator, e.g. ord(R 1 ) = ord(R 2 ). If we are interpreting the meaning of the abstraction operator in isolation, one idea might be to interpret each ord(R) as simply referring to R. However, this option immediately wrecks havoc on the intuitive properties of the ordinals. The standard progression of the ordinals, characterized by <, would no longer be a well-ordering. And, what's worse, we lose the right-to-left direction of O-AB.
A natural way to amend this proposal would be as follows. One first selects a canonical well-ordering for each isomorphism class. Then one interprets each ord(R) as simply referring to the canonical wellordering of R's isomorphism class. This enables us to recover O-AB. But the proposal is hardly satisfactory from either a technical or a philosophical perspective. From a technical perspective, defining ord(R) along these lines within second-order logic would require a strong principle of choice going beyond even the existence of a global well-ordering. It would indeed require a definable third-order well-ordering of the second-order domain, or something similar. From a philosophical perspective, the problem is, if anything, more acute. This interpretation of ord(R) requires that there be a determinate well-ordering that the expression picks out. But there is nothing about the usage of ordinal language that might fix such a reference. 14 However, it is possible to circumvent the problem with the second proposal by taking a page from Russell's playbook. We can let the isomorphism class of R determine the meaning of ord(R) if, rather than analyzing the meaning of ord(R) in isolation, we analyze its meaning in the context of a proposition. Instead of looking for reference for ord(R), we look for a paraphrase of statements in which ord(R) occurs. We want an identity statement between two ordinals to be true if the corresponding well-orderings are isomorphic. So, rather than assigning a canonical well-ordering to ord(R 1 ) and ord(R 2 ), we analyze an identity statement between two ordinals, for example ord(R 1 ) = ord(R 2 ), as simply expressing that there exist well-orderings V 1 and V 2 , isomorphic to R 1 and R 2 respectively, such that V 1 is identical to V 2 . Identity between second-order entities is cashed out, as usual, in third-order terms. 15 Next, we analyze atomic predication of the form P(ord(R)), where R is a well-ordering and P is an atomic predicate applicable to ordinals. Recall that our current strategy is to deny the second principle of ordinals. So we do not assume that ord(R) is a first-order entity, and thus we do not assume that P expresses a property of first-order entities. This opens the way to an analysis parallel to the one articulated in the previous paragraph. Just as above, we analyze P(ord(R)) as expressing that there is a well-ordering V isomorphic to R such that P(V ), where P is a higher-order counterpart of P.
Putting these ideas together, given well-orderings R 1 and R 2 , we might analyze the following statement ord(R 1 ) = ord(R 2 ) ∧ P(ord(R 1 ))
as
where the bound variables range over well-orderings. An analysis like this can be extended to the full vocabulary of the language of ordinals. We regiment this language in line with our denial of the second principle of ordinals. Since ordinals are not objects, we reserve a second sort for them, distinct from the object sort. To these basic sorts we add the standard vocabulary of second-order logic. We call the resulting language L Ω . Our analysis provides a translation procedure, which we denote by ' * ', mapping each formula ϕ of L Ω to a formula [ϕ] * of the language L 3 of third-order logic. 16 Crucially, the intuitive properties of ordinals reduce under this translation to pure theorems of third-order logic. Among these properties are O-AB and the structural properties of the progression of ordinals. In this sense, we vindicate the idea that talk of ordinals serves to convey higher-order logical content. 17 In the next section, we give the details of these formal languages and of the translation procedure. This discussion is rather technical. Readers more interested in the philosophical implications of our findings may skip ahead to section 4.3.
Implementation of the No-Class conception
We now take up the remaining task of explaining how to extend our analysis to the entire language. We begin by introducing the language L Ω . Then we provide the full translation procedure reducing this language to the pure language of third-order logic. After that, we present an example of a formal result that witnesses the viability of our no class approach to ordinals. 15 Note that the current proposal amounts essentially to analyzing ord(R 1 ) = ord(R 2 ) as expressing that R 1 and R 2 are isomorphic well-orderings. The particular implementation we adopt has the advantage of generality, as we will see in a moment. 16 Here we diverge from Klement's approach. We do not take ordinal talk to be an abbreviation. Rather, our translation procedure shows how ordinal talk as a sui generis language could be used to reason about and convey higher-order logical content. 17 The reader may wonder what framework we would use to cash out this notion of conveying content. Several are available, ranging from literal interpretation to rational reconstruction. We would prefer to remain neutral. Much of what we say can be embraced by advocates of any of these perspectives.
Let L 2 be the standard language of second-order logic, regarded as a multi-sorted language with object sort obj and, for every n, a sort S n for n-ary relations between objects. The vocabulary of the language is as follows.
(i) Infinitely many variables x 1 , x 2 ... of sort obj.
(ii) Infinitely many variables P n 1 , P n 2 , P n 3 ... of sort S n .
(iii) Standard logical symbols, including an identity sign of sort S 2 between two variables of sort obj, and parentheses.
The terms of L 2 are simply the variables above. The atomic formulas consist of a symbol of sort S neither a variable, or, if n = 2, the identity sign-followed by a sequence of n variables of sort obj. 18 Complex formulas are then built in the usual way using logical connectives and parentheses. Let L Ω be an expansion of L 2 with the these new sorts: a sort for ordinals ord and, for every n, a sort T n for n-ary relations over ordinals. In addition to the vocabulary of L 2 , we have new symbols as follows.
(iv) Infinitely many variables α 1 , α 2 ... of sort ord.
(v) Infinitely many variables A n 1 , A n 2 , A n 3 ... of sort T n .
(vi) A function symbol ord taking binary relations of sort S 2 as arguments and returning a value of sort ord (so the sort of the term ord(P 2 1 ) is ord).
(vii) An identity symbol of sort T 2 between two terms of sort ord.
In addition to the terms of L 2 and the variables above, L Ω contains terms formed by applying the symbol ord to a term of sort S 2 . And in addition to the atomic formulas of L 2 , the atomic formulas of L Ω consist of those obtained by applying symbols of sort T n to a sequence of n terms of sort ord. Finally, we arrive at a language L 3 of third-order logic, obtained by enriching L 2 with sorts for relations between lower-level relations over objects. In particular, for every n and every sequence of relation sorts S i 1 , . . . , S i n , we have a distinct sort U i 1 ,...,i n . As for the vocabulary of L 2 , we have new symbols as follows.
(viii) For every n and every sequence of sorts S i 1 , . . . , S i n , infinitely many variables:
(ix) Fresh second-order variables of sort S 2 : R 2 1 , R 2 2 , R 2 3 , . . . and V 2 1 ,V 2 2 ,V 2 3 , . . ..
The terms of L 3 comprise the terms of L 2 together with the variables above. The atomic formulas of L 3 are those generated by the formation rules of L 2 together with those obtained by applying symbols of sort U i 1 ,...,i n to a sequence of n terms of sorts S i 1 , . . . , S i n respectively. Strictly speaking ord only applies to the variables of sort S 2 in L Ω . However, to make the translation procedure more uniform, we do allow ord to apply to the fresh variables R 2 1 , R 2 2 , R 2 3 , . . . of L 3 . We describe the result as a pseudo-term of sort ord of L Ω . Likewise, we describe a formula containing such pseudoterms as a pseudo-formula of L Ω .
We are now ready to define a translation * from L Ω to L 3 showing how talk of ordinals can be eliminated. The translation is described by its action on atomic formulas and logical symbols. In order to define this translation, we first define two auxiliary translations • and †.
The translation • maps terms of sort ord to terms and pseudo-terms of sort ord.
Next, we define a translation † from atomic formulas and pseudo-formulas of L Ω to formulas of L 3 . This eliminates uses of the ord operator in favor of third-order vocabulary according to the strategy outlined in the previous section. We use ζ i as a metalinguistic variable ranging over terms P 2 i or R 2 i , and we understand identity between such terms in the usual third-order way. We use ζ i ∼ ζ j to abbreviate the pure second-order formula expressing that either ζ i and ζ j are isomorphic or neither ζ i nor ζ j is wellordered. Intuitively, the second clause here is intended to ensure that all relations that are not well-ordered are assigned the same abstract.
Note that † essentially generalizes the transformation on atomic sentences described in the previous section. That is, a basic predication such as, A m (ord(R)), is taken to express that there is a well-ordering V isomorphic to R such that X m (V ), where X m is a third-order counterpart of A m , as signaled by the matching subscripts. Finally, we recursively define the main translation * , a translation from L Ω to L 3 . We use metavariables of the form t i and x i for terms of sort ord and obj, respectively. We use [ϕ] * , t • i , and [ψ] † to denote the results of applying * , •, and † to ϕ, t i , and ψ, respectively.
The first six clauses are just identities. So these transformations leave the second-order formulas of L 2 untouched. The last four act as follows. Quantification over ordinals is replaced by quantification over relations of objects. Quantification over relations of ordinals is replaced by third-order quantification.
The atomic formulas are subject to the transformations • and † described above. Now that we have presented the translation, we will adopt the convention that unsuperscripted P 1 , R i , V i are to be read as decorated by the superscript '2'. A similar convention applies to variables X i , where the omitted superscript is the appropriate sequence '2',...,'2'.
Let us now look at a significant example of how the translation can be applied. Recall the principle of ordinal abstraction:
where the quantifiers are implicitly restricted to well-ordering. Let WO(ζ i ) abbreviate the pure secondorder formula expressing that ζ i is a well-ordering. We can now regiment O-AB in L Ω :
Consider the result of applying * to this formula:
Because * has no effect on second-order vocabulary, we have:
Let us focus, for the moment, on [ord(P i ) = ord(P j )] * . This is [ord(P i ) • = ord(P j ) • ] † . Since • has no effect on ord(ζ i ), we only need to consider the effect of †, which gives us:
Substituting (3) into (2), we obtain:
Note that, since P i and P j are restricted to well-orderings, ∼ in the consequent is equivalent to ∼ =. Thus (4) is equivalent to:
It is easy to verify that (5) is a theorem of third-order logic (recall that identity between second-order variables is cashed out in third-order terms). This result is significant. We have just shown that the translation of O-AB under * is a logical truth. This is a prime example of how talk of ordinals can be interpreted as conveying higher-order logical content.
The No-Class theory of the ordinals
The result that the regimentation of ordinal abstraction in L Ω is carried by our translation to a validity of third-order logic is not isolated. Instead, we find a rich theory emerging from results of this kind. Our main contention is that this theory constitutes a robust conception of the ordinals. Denote by No-Class the set of sentences of L Ω whose translation under * is a theorem of thirdorder logic. 19 Remarkably, No-Class turns out to be closed under standard logical rules concerning the connectives and the identity symbol. So it is not simply a set of sentences-it is a theory which sustains ordinary classical reasoning. And, moreover, this theory includes all of the key properties of ordinals. This is where its philosophical significance lies. We can regard the properties of ordinals as arising naturally from the translation scheme rather than as given by special-purpose axioms.
Specifically, No-Class includes O-AB, as noted above, as well as the full comprehension schema for both relations over objects and relations over ordinals. In this respect, it achieves something that none of its competitors manages to do: consistently combining O-AB and full comprehension. Verifying the consistency of No-Class is easy. There are sentences of L Ω that do not belong to No-Class. Take any sentence ϕ of second-order logic that is not valid. Since the translation leaves the second-order formulas untouched, the translation of ϕ is ϕ. By definition, a sentence whose translation is not valid is not included in No-Class. Hence ϕ is not included in No-Class, which is therefore not a trivial theory. So No-Class witnesses the consistency of the theory of ordinals axiomatized by O-AB given the appropriate sortal restrictions characteristic of L Ω . 20 We postpone the proofs of these claims to the appendix.
What other facts about ordinals are contained in No-Class? Since this theory contains each theorem of second-order logic, it contains all theorems about well-orderings provable in pure second-order logic. In particular, it includes the key lemma in the paradox of Burali-Forti: if every proper initial segment of one well-ordering R 1 is isomorphic to a proper initial segment of another R 2 , then R 1 is isomorphic to an initial segment of R 2 . Here No-Class seems to do better than a predicative theory of ordinals, as the latter most likely cannot prove this lemma (see footnote 8). Moreover, contra Burali-Forti, the ordinals can be shown to be linearly ordered. Furthermore, contra Russell (1903, 323) , the ordinals can be shown to be well-founded. So No-Class contains Jourdain's theorem that the ordinals are well-ordered. A corollary of this fact is that No-Class supports transfinite induction (see Appendix C).
However, No-Class leaves open certain questions about ordinals. In particular, it leaves open how many ordinals there are. It only allows us to prove that there are two ordinals. The first ordinal, if we can call it that, is associated with relations that are not well-orderings. Neologicists would call it the bad abstract of the principle of ordinal abstraction. The second ordinal is associated with the empty relation, whose existence is provable in pure second-order logic.
The fact that the theory does not allow us prove that there are more than two ordinals is, we contend, unproblematic. This is in keeping with the No-Class conception of the ordinals according to which talk of ordinals is a vehicle to convey purely logical information. As usually conceived, third-order logic carries minimal existential information, hence we should not expect that, without further assumptions, talk of ordinals will be ontologically profligate. Instead, as we might hope, No-Class does carry significant conditional information about ordinals. For example, if there are three objects, then four ordinals can be shown to exist-counting the bad abstract as an ordinal. Assuming the standard semantics for secondorder logic, it is easy to verify that if there are countably many objects, then there are uncountably many ordinals. So adding existential assumptions about objects to No-Class will imply the existence of more ordinals. The same effect can be obtained on the basis of an ontologically richer conception of logic. If one prefers non-standard logical axioms implying substantial existential claims, one will be able to show that the set of sentences translating theorems of third-order logic comprises more existential claims about ordinals. 21 No-Class recovers the intuitive properties of ordinals. But how does it diagnose the paradox of Burali-Forti? The answer is that, while No-Class proves the main lemmas of the paradoxical reasoning, the proof of the contradiction breaks down in the final stages of the argument. One cannot prove in No-Class that for every ordinal α, α is the representative of < α , i.e. that α = ord(< α ). While the relation < α can be defined and proven to be a well-ordering, < α is no longer a well-ordering of objects. Thus ord(< α ) is not well-formed, since the ord operator applies only to relations of objects.
Objections
Our solution to the paradox of Burali-Forti turns on a type distinction. From the point of view of L Ω , ordinals are not objects but sui generis entities conveying information about logical constructions. One might object that this treatment does violence to the concept of ordinals. Linguistically, we do not seem to distinguish between talk of objects and talk of ordinals. The same predicates can be applied to ordinary noun phrases and noun phrases referring to ordinals. This-the objection goes-is at least prima facie reason to believe that ordinals just are objects.
To this objection we have a number of replies. First of all, it is not clear that ordinals were always conceived this way. For instance, Zermelo seemed to have conceived them as sui generis entities in his influential 1930 paper. Second, syntactic intuitions are notoriously defeasible. For example, we often tend to nominalize expressions of various syntactic categories, ranging from adjectives to verbs and sentences, but this is consistent with the view that the best formalization of some of these expressions will assign them to a logical category other than the category of ordinary logical subjects. A case in point is talk of relations: even though we commonly refer to them by means of noun phrases, mere consistency often forces us to represent them as entities of higher types. This brings us to a third, general point: respecting syntactic intuitions opens the door to a host of paradoxes. While the objector might have in mind a different solution to the paradox of Burali-Forti, they will presumably have to violate naïve syntactic distinctions somewhere. If not in the solution of Burali-Forti's paradox, at least in the solution of paradoxes arising from conceiving of relations as objects (e.g. Russell 1908, 222-223) .
There is another objection in a similar vein. Perhaps one could complain that while our sortal distinctions are not conceptually problematic, they prevent us from considering order types that evidently can be considered. Because in our framework the ord operator cannot be applied to relations among ordinals, we cannot refer to the order type of such relations. But-the objection continues-one obviously can refer to such order types. In fact, we just did. Thus the proposal illegitimately restricts our ability to refer to ordinals.
This objection neglects one key feature of our proposal. We do not set out to describe a preexisting domain of ordinals. Rather, we aim to describe how ordinal talk emerges naturally from higher-order reasoning about a preexisting domain of objects. In principle, after ordinals have been introduced in this way, there is no obstacle to taking them to form a new domain of objects. New talk of ordinals would then emerge from higher-order reasoning about this new domain. So the initial restriction on the order types one can consider can be overcome by iterating our construction. Gödel makes essentially this point about Russell's no class theory:
[T]he restrictions involved do not appear as ad hoc hypotheses for avoiding the paradoxes, but as unavoidable consequences of the thesis that classes, concepts, and quantified propositions do not exist as real objects. It is not as if the universe of things were divided into orders and then one were prohibited to speak of all orders; but, on the contrary, it is possible to speak of all existing things; only, classes and concepts are not among them; and if they are introduced as a façon de parler, it turns out that this very extension of the symbolism gives rise to the possibility of introducing them in a more comprehensive way, and so on indefinitely. (Gödel 1944, 133) This iterated construction thus leads to superordinals, super-superordinals, and so on. For example, we are free to introduce a new abstraction operator applying to relations over ordinals (our sort T 2 from section 4.2). This move will yield superordinals that regiment talk about order types of ordinals. Further repetitions of this procedure allow us to regiment "iterated" ordinal talk, such as talk of order types of order types of ordinals.
The objector might, at this point, chime in that this sounds like a hierarchy of proper classes. But proper classes are often thought to signal a failure of absolute generality (see, e.g., Parsons 1974b and Boolos 1998) . This objection might seem particularly serious, since the ability to capture absolute generality was an important virtue of the no class approach.
However, this version of the objection overlooks a disanalogy between our conception of ordinals and the conception of proper classes that threatens absolute generality. Proper classes are conceived as set-like objects lying outside the domain of quantification operative in ordinary set theory. But, as we noted above, we do not aim to describe a preexisting domain of ordinals. Rather, we interpret talk of ordinals as conveying logical information about a preexisting domain of objects. Quantification over objects remains absolutely general: we can talk about absolutely all the objects that exist. The possibility of introducing more ordinals is not a sign that there are more ordinals that lie beyond our initial domain of quantification. As Gödel observes, it is instead a sign that every extension of our symbolism gives rise to the possibility of introducing a more comprehensive symbolism. A better analogy is perhaps one between our conception of the ordinals and the interpretation of proper classes in terms of plural quantification, which is consistent with absolute generality (Uzquiano 2003 and Burgess 2004) . Just like the plural interpretation can serve to, for example, make sense of talk of proper classes, our approach could be put to use in making sense of talk of order-types longer that the order-type of the Von Neumann ordinals; talk of this kind is occasionally found in the practice of set theory (see Shapiro 2003 as well as Shapiro and Wright 2006 for discussion).
Conclusion
We surveyed a number of options for dealing with the paradox of Burali-Forti conceived as a paradox about ordinal numbers rather than sets. As we emphasized, all available options sacrifice one or more of the intuitive principles behind the paradox. In the spirit of Russell's no class theory, our proposal rejects the principle that ordinals are objects. Rejecting this one principle allows us to provide a consistent account of talk of ordinals. The main features of our account are well motivated by a no class conception of the ordinals. On that conception, talk of ordinals can be seen as a vehicle for conveying third-order logical content. Our work shows that a translation procedure suggested by this conception yields a theory of ordinals capturing their key structural properties. Adding this theory into the mix, the situation appears to be the following:
Restricting comprehension ?
No-Class
One might ask whether our translation procedure could provide a more general account of mathematical entities obtained by abstraction. We regard this as an open question. Much of the plausibility of our no class theory of the ordinals derives from the fact that the main theorems about ordinals can be recovered in L Ω . The same might not be true for other kinds of abstracta. But, then again, it might be. Perhaps there is a general theorem showing that the main features of abstracta will be recoverable from a corresponding no class theory. Such a theorem would be a major contribution to the longstanding program of reducing mathematics to higher-order logic. The fact that this can be done for the ordinals gives grounds for cautious optimism. 22 22 For helpful comments and discussion, we would like to thank Andrew Arana, Patricia Blanchette, Francesca Boccuni, Luca Incurvati, Nick Jones, Ansten Klev, Øystein Linnebo, Richard Pettigrew, Agustín Rayo, Ian Rumfitt, Andrea Sereni, Stewart Shapiro, Sean Walsh, and an anonymous reviewer. We also wish to extend heartfelt thanks to audiences at the following venues: Logica 2015, University of Bristol, University of Oslo, and FilMat 2016 at the University of Chieti-Pescara. Their feedback helped shape the development of this article.
Here we provide some basic definitions for the higher-order languages introduced above. A field of a two-place relation R is any monadic property M such that for any x, M(x) if and only if there is y such that R(x, y) or R(y, x). The relation R is a well-ordering if R is (i) irreflexive, (ii) transitive, and (iii) any subproperty P of a field of R has an R-least element.
An initial segment of a relation R 1 with respect to x is any relation R 2 such that, for any y and z, R 2 (y, z) if and only if R 1 (y, z), R 1 (y, z), and R 1 (z, x). We usually denote the restriction of R with respect to x as R x . A relation R 2 is an initial segment of R 1 if there is x such that R 2 is an initial segment of R 1 with respect to x. An inverse R −1 of a relation R is defined standardly.
A relation F is a function from a monadic property P 1 to a monadic property P 2 if it meets the usual conditions. The notions of domain and range are then defined as usual. We adopt the standard abuse of notation in using F(x) to the denote the unique y such that F(x, y), i.e. the image of x under F.
Two relations R 1 and R 2 are said to be isomorphic if there is a function F from a field of R 1 to a field of R 2 such that if R 1 (x, y), then R 2 (F(x), F(y)), and if R 2 (x, y), then R 1 (F −1 (x), F −1 (y)). We use R 1 ∼ = F R 2 to indicate that F witnesses that R 1 is isomorphic to R 2 . The notation R 1 ∼ = R 2 represents that R 1 ∼ = F R 2 for some F.
Appendix B: The paradox of Burali-Forti
We now outline the reasoning of the paradox. Most of the proof is straightforward but labor-intensive. So we only provide its most illuminating structural features. We work within a standard language of second-order logic, parallel to L 2 , with one additional function symbol 'ord' from elements of sort S 2 to elements of the object sort obj.
The first lemma guarantees that there is at most one way to extend an isomorphism defined on an initial segment of a well-ordering.
Lemma 1. Let R and R be well-orderings. Suppose there are functions F and G such that for some x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 , R x 1 ∼ = F R x 2 and R y 1 ∼ = G R y 2 . Then if R(y 1 , x 1 ), the function F contains the function G, i.e. for all z 1 and z 2 , G(z 1 , z 2 ) only if F(z 1 , z 2 ).
The second lemma, against the backdrop of the first, guarantees that there is at least one way to extend an isomorphism defined on an initial segment of a well-ordering. This is established via impredicative comprehension.
Lemma 2. Let R and R be well-orderings. Suppose that for every y in the field of R, there is an initial segment W of R and an isomorphism F such that R y ∼ = F W . Then R is either isomorphic to R or to one of its initial segments.
Let us define an ordinal to be any object x such that, for some binary relation R, x = ord(R). By second-order comprehension, there is a relation < between ordinals characterized by the following condition: for every x and y, x < y if and only if there are relations R 1 and R 2 such that x = ord(R 1 ) and y = ord(R 2 ) and either (i) R 1 and R 2 are well-orderings and R 1 is isomorphic to a proper initial segment of R 2 , or (ii) R 2 is a well-ordering and R 1 is not.
Recall that the first principle of ordinals, which was formalized as the principle of ordinal abstraction O-AB, states that isomorphic well-orderings are always represented by the same ordinal and nonisomorphic well-orderings are always represented by different ordinals. The leaves open the behavior of the ord operator when applied to relations that are not well-ordered. For simplicity, we assume that relations that are not well-ordered are all represented by the same bad abstract. Thus two relations have the same ordinal if and only if they are isomorphic well-orderings or neither of them is a well-ordering. Recall that we used the notation R 1 ∼ R 2 to denote exactly this relation. So this modified principle of abstraction, which we dub O-AB , can be stated as:
Note that, given O-AB , the first ordinal in the ordering <, call it 0, is the bad abstract. The next ordinal, call it 1, is the representative of empty relations. Next, we have 2, the representative of well-orderings with two-element fields. And so on. The progression is a well-ordering with the interesting feature that any ordinal is the representative of the ordering of its predecessors. For example, the portion of < before 2, i.e. < 2 , is a well-ordering with a two-element field and hence is represented by 2. This is captured by the following lemmas.
Lemma 3. If O-AB , then the relation < is a well-ordering of the ordinals.
Lemma 4. Let R be a well-ordering. Given O-AB , if x = ord(R), then there is F such that < x ∼ = F R.
Lemma 5. If O-AB , then for every ordinal x except the bad abstract, x = ord(< x ).
The paradox of Burali-Forti corresponds to the reasoning leading to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. O-AB is inconsistent.
Appendix C: The No-Class theory
Recall the definitions of section 4.2. We have the languages L 2 , L Ω , and L 3 . Moreover, we have a translation * from L Ω to L 3 . We defined No-Class as the set of L Ω -sentences such that their translation under * is a theorem of third-order logic.
The first result about the No-Class theory is that it is indeed a theory. That is, the No-Class theory is closed under ordinary rules of inference. To demonstrate that this is so, we need to specify a system of deduction for L Ω . The most convenient system for our purposes will be the Hilbert system whose sole rule of inference is modus ponens, and whose logical axioms are the universal closures of instances of the following schemes 1-8.
In schemes 4-6, the schematic variable x ranges over variables of each sort in L Ω (i.e. obj, ord, S n , and T n ). 4. ∀x(ϕ → ψ) → (∀xϕ → ∀xψ) 5. ϕ → ∀xϕ, where x does not occur freely in ϕ.
6. ∀xϕ → ϕ(t/x) where the term t is free for x in ϕ.
In schemes 7-8, the schematic variables s,t range over terms of sort obj and ord.
We say that ϕ implies ψ (ϕ ψ) if there exists a sequence of L Ω -formulas ϕ, χ 1 , . . . , χ n−1 , ψ such that each formula is either the result of applying modus ponens to a pair of earlier formulas, or the universal closure of an instance of one of the schemes above.
The first result is given by the following theorem. We will argue directly that the translation of each scheme is provable using the corresponding closures of 1-8 for each sort in the language of third-order logic. This implies that the closure of the translated scheme is provable as well, since if a formula with a free variable is provable using those axioms, then its universal closure is provable from them as well. Thus the translation of the closure of each scheme is provable, as required.
For the tautologically valid schemes 1-3, this is immediate, since the translation * commutes with truth functional connectives.
For axiom 4, we have four possible cases:
It is easy to verify that all four translations are tautologies of third-order logic. For the scheme 5, we again have four possible cases: we can consider four cases: either x is x i , α i , P n m , or A n m . If it is x i , P n m , or A n m , then t must also be a variable of that sort, since those sorts have no non-variable terms in L Ω . If x is α i , then t must be of sort ord, i.e. either α j or ord(P j ) for some relation P j of sort S 2 .
An easy induction confirms that a first-order or second-order object variable which is freely substitutable for x remains freely substitutable after the translation. If x is a second-order ordinal variable, then it is replaced by a corresponding third-order variable, which is again, by induction, freely substitutable for the third-order variable corresponding to x. These observations handle the cases where x is x i , P n m , or A n m .
In the final case, namely where x is an ordinal variable α i , [∀α i ϕ] * is ∀R i [ϕ(ord(R i )/α i )] * . Now, t is either another ordinal variable, or is ord(P j ) for some P j not bound by any quantifier having scope over α i .
We handle each of these cases in turn. For this argument, we will assume that * has been extended to act on complex pseudo-formulas of L Ω (i.e. formulas containing pseudo-terms) by commuting with connectives according to the same rules used to define * initially.
In the first case, when t is an ordinal variable α j ,
By the correspondence of subscripts and the fact that α j is freely substitutable for α i in ϕ, we have that R j is freely substitutable for R i in [ϕ(ord(R i )/α i )] * . So, in this case, the translation of our initial scheme is:
And this is an instance of the axiom 6, and hence a theorem of third-order logic.
The second case, when t is ord(P i ) for some P i not bound by any quantifier having scope over α i , is handled similarly. We conclude that instances of 6 are in No-Class.
The next axiom scheme, 7, is clear for variables of sort obj. For terms of sort ord we have:
and in each case the translation is an obvious theorem of third-order logic. Finally, 8 is clear when we are not dealing with ordinal terms. When we are dealing with ordinal terms, 8 becomes one of the following:
along with the obvious reversal of the second case. These schemes translate, respectively, as:
We argue that, in every case, the consequent will be provable, under the assumption of the antecedent, by induction on the complexity of ϕ. If ϕ is atomic, it either fails to contain α k (in which case the conditional is tautological) or, if it contains α k , it is either an equality or it is the predication of a second-order variable of a sequence of ordinal variables. In each case, verifying that the antecedent above implies the atomic consequent is an exercise in natural deduction, and confirms that the closure of the atomic instances of 8 are in No-Class. If ϕ is ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 , we have:
By inductive hypothesis, the formulas
are in theorems of third-order logic. So it is straightforward to derive the corresponding conditional for ϕ.
The remaining case, where ϕ is ¬ψ or ϕ is ∀xψ, are similarly straightforward, requiring only a mechanical application of the translation procedure and modicum of natural deduction.
QED
Let us now turn to second-order comprehension. Consider the parameter-free comprehension scheme, which is expressed in the vocabulary of L Ω thus: ∃P n m ∀x 1 . . . x n (P n m (x 1 . . . x n ) ↔ ϕ)
Since * commutes with ∀P n m , ∀x i , and with the biconditional, and * is the identity on P n m (x 1 . . . x n ), we have the following translation of (a):
But (b) is just an instance of the second-order comprehension scheme now expressed in L 3 , and so it is a theorem of third-order logic.
The result extends to instances of comprehension with parameters. These will be universal closures of formulas like (a), where ϕ contains one or more free variables of any sort available in L Ω . Translating such formulas will yield closures of formulas like (b), since each quantifier of the initial universal block will be carried by * to a universal quantifier (although perhaps binding a variable of a different sort). Thus we have the following.
Remark (Second-Order Comprehension). Every universal closure of the following scheme is part of No-Class:
∃P n m ∀x 1 . . . x n (P n m (x 1 . . . x n ) ↔ ϕ(x 1 . . . x n )) where P n m does not occur in ϕ.
Since No-Class contains second-order comprehension and is closed under , it also contains any theorem of second order logic provable from the comprehension scheme. In particular, it contains the lemmas 1 and 2 mentioned in Appendix B, since those can be proven without any resources going beyond comprehension.
By the argument given in section 4.2, we also have that the principle of ordinal abstraction, O-AB, is part of No-Class.
Theorem 3 (O-AB). The following statement belongs to No-Class.
∀P i , P j (WO(P i ) ∧ WO(P j ) → (ord(P i ) = ord(P j ) ↔ P i ∼ = P j )) Moreover, by a similar argument, we even have that the stronger principle O-AB * , discussed in Appendix B, is part of No-Class.
Theorem 4 (O-AB * ). The following statement belongs to No-Class.
∀P i , P j (ord(P i ) = ord(P j ) ↔ P i ∼ P j )
Corollary. The claim that there is exactly one "bad ordinal" is in No-Class.
Since No-Class includes a sort for relations over ordinals, one might naturally ask whether these relations support comprehension. It turns out that they do. But the proof requires a bit more effort than the demonstration of the Remark above that relations over objects support comprehension. We begin with a lemma.
Lemma 6 (Substitution Lemma). If [ϕ(ord(P i 1 ) . . . ord(P i n ))] * is a translation of a formula in L Ω , then the closure of ∀P i 1 . . . P i n , P j 1 . . . P j n (P i 1 ∼ P j 1 ∧ · · · ∧ P i 1 ∼ P j 1 → ([ϕ(ord(P i 1 ), . . . , ord(P i n ))] * ↔ [ϕ(ord(P j 1 ), . . . , ord(P j n ))] * ))
is a theorem of third-order logic.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ. This is clear for ϕ atomic, and the induction cases are straightforward.
Now we are ready to prove the target theorem.
Theorem 5 (Ordinal Comprehension). Every closure of the following scheme is part of No-Class:
∃A n m ∀α i 1 . . . α i n (A n m (α i 1 . . . α i n ) ↔ ϕ)
where A n m does not occur in ϕ.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that ϕ does not contain any free ordinal variables other than α i 1 . . . α i n . Otherwise, by replacing the stray ordinal variables with appropriate terms of the form ord(P i ), we can find another formula ϕ 1 without any free ordinal variables other than α i 1 . . . α i n such that [∃A n m ∀α i 1 . . . α i n (A n m (α i 1 . . . α i n ) ↔ ϕ)] * is logically equivalent to [∃A n m ∀α i 1 . . . α i n (A n m (α i 1 . . . α i n ) ↔ ϕ 1 )] * A partial translation of the ordinal comprehension scheme will be a universal closure of the following ∃X m ∀R i 1 . . . R i n [A n m (ord(R i 1 ), . . . , ord(R i n ))] * ↔ [ϕ(ord(R i 1 ) . . . ord(R i n ))] * (a)
We can further unpack the left-hand side of the embedded biconditional to produce
Now, apply third-order comprehension to the formula:
∃R j 1 . . . ∃R j n V j 1 ∼ R j 1 ∧ ... ∧V j n ∼ R j n ∧ [ϕ(ord(R j 1 ) . . . ord(R j k ))] * which we may abbreviate as ψ(V j 1 , . . . ,V j n ). Thus:
Pick a particular witness X k to (b). We claim that this witness is also a witness to (a) above. For, let R i 1 . . . R i n be arbitrary, and suppose that X k together with these relations satisfies the left-hand side of (a). We need to derive the right-hand side of (a). By the unpacking of the left-hand side, we then have that there exist V i 1 . . .V i n falling under X k , such that V i 1 ∼ R i 1 . . .V i n ∼ R i n . Since V i 1 . . .V i n fall under X k , we know-by the comprehension scheme (b) that introduced X k -that there are R j 1 . . . R j n such that [ϕ(ord(R j 1 ) . . . ord(R j n ))] * and such that R j 1 ∼ V i 1 , . . . , R j n ∼ V i n . Hence, by transitivity of ∼, we have R j 1 ∼ R i 1 . . . R j n ∼ R i n . But then by Lemma 6, we see that we have the right-hand side of (a), [ϕ(ord(R i 1 ) . . . ord(R i n ))] * , as required. Now we prove the other direction. Suppose that [ϕ(ord(R i 1 ) . . . ord(R i n ))] * . We then have ψ(R i 1 , . . . , R i n ), taking the R i 1 . . . R i n themselves as witnesses to the existential quantifiers of ψ(R i 1 , . . . , R i n ). Hence X k (R i 1 , . . . R i n ). But then, once again taking the R i 1 . . . R i n themselves as witnesses, we see that the R i 1 . . . R i n together with X k satisfy the unpacking of the left-hand side of the translation of ordinal comprehension, as required. QED We have now shown not only that No-Class is a theory, but also that it is a natural theory of the ordinals as regimented in the language L Ω . On the one hand, it includes comprehension principles for each of the concept sorts in this language. On the other hand, it includes intuitive principles concerning the notion of ordinal, chiefly that of ordinal abstraction. We conclude by showing that these principles suffice to establish two additional intuitive facts about the ordinals. The first is that the ordinals are well-ordered. The second is that the ordinals support transfinite induction.
Theorem 6. Let < be the ordering of ordinals defined in Appendix B. Then it is a theorem of No-Class that < is well-ordered.
Proof. Working in No-Class, we need to establish that < is:
(a) transitive, (b) total, (c) well-founded.
One proves (a) and (b) by proving in second-order logic the universal closures of the following statements, where F, G, R, S, T can be any of the variables P i .
These facts about well-orderings then straightforwardly imply the relevant facts about the corresponding ordinals.
The proof that the well-foundedness of < belongs to No-Class is a formalization of the following reasoning. For legibility, we use variables A and A as abbreviations for unary ordinal relations, the variable P as an abbreviation for a unary object relation, variables α, β , γ as abbreviations for ordinal variables, and variables x and R with various subscripts as abbreviations for objects and binary object relations, respectively.
Suppose there were A contained in the field of < with no least element. Let α be some ordinal in A, and let A be given by the following instance of ordinal comprehension:
We claim that A has no least element. If it had one, say β , then this ordinal would not be least in A, since A is assumed not to have a least element. So there would be some γ < β < α with A(γ). But then A (γ), contradicting the fact that β is least in A . So A has no least element.
We know that α represents at least one well-ordering. Let R be some such well-ordering, so that ord(R) = α. For each β such that A (β ), there exist R and x such that ord(R ) = β , and R x ∼ = R . Let P be a concept contained the field of R satisfying ∀x(P(x) ↔ ∃β (A (β ) ∧ ord(R x ) = β ))
Consider an arbitrary element y such that P(y), and β such that ord(R y ) = β . It follows from the definition of P that A (β ). Since A has no least element and A (β ), we know that there is some γ such that A (γ) with γ < β . Since A (γ), γ < α, thus there exists z such that ord(R z ) = γ. Hence P(z). Given that γ < β , ord(R z ) < ord(R y ). That implies that R(z, y).
We have shown that, for an arbitrary y such that P(y), there is a smaller z such that P(z). So we have confirmed that P has no least element. But this contradicts the well-foundedness of R. So our initial assumption-that there is A contained in the field of < with no least element-must be rejected. Thus < is well-founded.
Corollary (Transfinite Induction). The universal closure of each instance of the following scheme is in No-Class.
∀α (∀β (β < α → ϕ(β )) → ϕ(α)) → ∀α ϕ(α)
